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Criminal Law
By Joseph J. Drolet*

Criminal law and procedure took some interesting and curious turns
during the period of this survey. This article will first cover some of the
most novel and notable case decisions of the year. Then a summary will
be given of the changes wrought by the 1980 Georgia General Assembly.
Finally, some of the recent trends in case law handed down by Georgia's
appellate courts will be discussed.
I.

A.

NOTABLE NEW DECISIONS

Compulsory Handwriting Samples

Prior to State v. Armstead,1 law enforcement agencies could require
criminal defendants to write out handwriting samples for comparison
with questioned documents. State v. Armstead halted this practice and
held that even though such practice does not violate the United States
Constitution, it violates the Georgia Constitution and Georgia Code Ann.
section 38-416.' The Court found a distinction between handwriting and
other forms of physical testing of the defendant in that handwriting exemplars require the defendant to do an act while blood test and other
physical tests simply require the defendant to submit to an act. Although
this is a decision of a single panel of the court of appeals, the effect has
been to create instability in an area of law that had been relatively calm
8
since Schmerber v. California.
B.

Right to Counsel Plus Concurrent Self-Representation
In another case relying on the Georgia Constitution, Burney v. State,'

* Assistant District Attorney, Atlanta Judicial Circuit. University of Illinois (B.S. in Economics, 1966; J.D. 1969). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. 152 Ga. App. 56, 262 S.E.2d 233 (1979).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-416 (1974).
3. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
4. 244 Ga. 33, 257 S.E.2d 543 (1979).
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the Georgia Supreme Court found that even though a defendant already
had two court appointed lawyers, he had the additional right to represent himself and act as co-counsel. The Georgia Constitution, unlike the
United States Constitution, says that "No person shall be deprived of the
right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this
state, in person, by attorney, or both. ' * Such language does not appear in
the United States Constitution.
This decision places defense lawyers and trial judges in very awkward
positions in dealing with indigent defendants. Every recent draft of the
Georgia Constitution introduced in the Georgia General Assembly has
omitted the words "or both," which appear in the quoted section of the
Bill of Rights, and if this language is not eventually removed, there will
undoubtedly follow interesting and disruptive situations.
C.

Charge on Presumption of Intent

A traditional part of the standard charge given in criminal cases came
under attack in Skrine v. State,6 an attack based on the United States
Supreme Court case of Sandstrom v. Montana.' The charge that "a person. . . is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
his acts" was upheld in Skrine because, unlike the Sandstrom situation,
the charge in Georgia is followed by language informing the jury that this
presumption is rebuttable. Thus, the court found that this language from
Georgia Code Ann. section 26-6048 was not burden-shifting. The ruling in
Skrine has not yet been challenged in the United States Supreme Court,
but undoubtedly it will be.
D. Airport Profile Searches
In State v. Reid9 and McShan v. State,10 the validity of stopping airline passengers who fit a drug courier profile was addressed. In Reid, the
court found that even though the entire profile was not present, enough
grounds existed to give federal drug agents an articulable suspicion and
justification to stop the defendant. In McShan, the decision to affirm the
conviction turned on the defendant's consent to search after he had been
stopped.
Both Reid and McShan have been vacated by the United States Supreme Court and have been remanded to the Georgia courts for a deter5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 9, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-109 (1977) (emphasis added).
244 Ga. 520, 260 S.E.2d 900 (1979).
442 U.S. 510 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-604 (1977).
149 Ga. App. 685, 255 S.E.2d 71, vacated, 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980).
150 Ga. App. 232, 257 S.E.2d 202, vacated mem., 100 S. Ct. 2981 (1980).
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mination as to whether the defendants were actually seized (arrested or
"stopped") or whether they were subjected to some lesser level of contact
or encounter. These cases will probably return to the United States Supreme Court on that question and may result in some new law on encounters that do not quite amount to a Terry v. Ohio1" "stop".
E. Transcript of Voir Dire
In Graham v. State,"' the court of appeals, in a 6-3 decision, broke with
a long line of cases and held that the voir dire must be included in the
transcript of all felony trials. The court strictly applied Georgia Code
Ann. section 27-2401,'1 to require transcription of everything but the argument of counsel.
F. Voir Dire-RequiringUse of Peremptory Strike to Excuse A Biased
Juror
In Bradham v. State,"' a prospective juror said he would give more
credence to the testimony of a police officer than he would to a lay witness. The trial court declined to excuse the juror for cause and defense
counsel was required to use a peremptory challenge, leaving him no
strikes when he later needed one. The supreme court found the trial
court's ruling to be reversible error. The question remains open, however,
whether the same result will prevail in a case in which there is no exhaustion of a defendant's peremptory strikes.
G.

Jackson v. Virginia

Probably the most earthshaking development in recent years was a decision of the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia,5 a
case now cited by both Georgia appellate courts in nearly every criminal
decision. Jackson v. Virginia revolutionized the relationship between
state and federal courts by breaking with two centuries of legal precedent
and declaring that the sufficiency of the evidence is an issue of constitutional proportions reviewable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. A federal magistrate can now second-guess a jury and the highest court of any
state if he disagrees with their determination that the evidence was sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. The effect of the decision is to
make every existing judgment in a criminal case subject to federal habeas
11.

12.
13.
14.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

153 Ga. App. 658, 266 S.E.2d 316 (1980).
§ 27-2401 (1978).

GA. CODE ANN.

243 Ga. 638, 256 S.E.2d 311 (1979).

15. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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corpus review. Every state case is now potentially a federal case.
H.

Double Jeopardy

. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals in
State v. Burroughs1" to hold that disposition of a case in municipal court
does not bar later proceedings in state court if the elements of the two
offenses were different. The defendant had been convicted of disorderly
conduct in municipal court (interfering with a person's occupation) and
with simple battery in state court. The supreme court noted that one
could interfere with another's occupation without committing a battery.
II.

ACTION

BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Spurred on by a great deal of publicity about rampant crime, the Georgia General Assembly, in its 1980 session, made some notable changes in
criminal law and procedure, while following their custom of adding a variety of new categories of crimes to Georgia law.
Among the most significant new-crime bills was Senate Bill 296,17
which made it a felony for a convicted felon to possess a firearm. This
new law, based on a similar federal statute, was able to pass the general
assembly with relative ease while proposals for any form of gun registration or licensing, including those proposals sponsored by the Governor,
suffered total annihilation.
Four of the Governor's bills creating new crimes fared much better
than his "gun" legislation. Probably the most controversial legally is the
Loitering and Prowling Bill,18 which goes to great lengths to explain exactly what type of conduct is proscribed. Whether the bill has succeeded
in avoiding vagueness problems remains to be seen. The new statute,
Georgia Code Ann. section 26-216,'0 reads as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of loitering or prowling when one is in
a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals
under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or
immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
(b) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining
whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight
upon the appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify
himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless
flight by the person or other circumstances make it impracticable, a law
16.
17.

244 Ga. 288, 260 S.E.2d 5 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2914 (Supp. 1980).

18.

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2616 (Supp. 1980).

19.

Id.

CRIMINAL LAW

19801

enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this
section, afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person
shall be convicted of an offense under this section if the law enforcement
officer failed to comply with the foregoing procedure, or if it appears at
trial that the explanation given by the person was true and, would have
dispelled the alarm or immediate concern.
Senate Bill 40520 creates the new crime of bail-jumping, a bill long
sought by many judges and prosecutors. The terms of this legislation are
rather simple. Failure to appear in court after one has been notified to
appear is punishable as a felony if the original charge is a felony offense.
Failure to appear is punishable as a misdemeanor if the original charge is
a misdemeanor. Another of the Governor's bills was the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.2 ' The Governor came to
the aid of this pending bill, which had been introduced with little fanfare
in 1979, and helped secure its passage through both houses of the general
assembly in 1980. This law is another clone of a federal statute, and its
basic feature is the addition of civil proceedings to condemn property
held by criminal enterprises where there exists a pattern of racketeering
activity.
Other new crimes in the Governor's package were the "trafficking in
drugs" offenses2 2 which were piggy-backed on the existing Controlled
Substances Act. If a person possesses relatively large quantities of drugs
he can be indicted for trafficking and be subjected to mandatory large
fines and imprisonment. Since the potential prison terms are actually no
longer than those in the existing law, the net effect of the statute may
only be its public relations value.
Among the other new categories of crimes created in 1980, the most
interesting is found in Georgia Code Ann. section 88-2710.1,28 "wanton or
malicious removal of dead body from grave and disturbance of contents
of grave." The bill was apparently inspired by a teenage drinking party in
a cemetery where graves were disturbed, but there was no intent by the
party goers to sell or dissect the bodies as was required under the existing
law.
Another bill closely rivalling House Bill 1592 is Senate Bill 577."
Under new code section 26-2802.1, removing a "collar, tag, tatoo or any
identification" from an animal is a misdemeanor. This legislation will
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ANN. § 26-2511 (Supp. 1980).
ANN. ch. 26-34 (Supp. 1980).
ANN. § 79A-811 (Supp. 1980).
ANN. § 88-2710.1 (Supp. 1980).
ANN. § 26-2802.1 (Supp. 1980).
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surely help stamp out crime. House Bill 4072" creates a new regulatory
scheme for anyone selling "business opportunities" in Georgia. The bill
attempts to fill the gap between securities violations and lawful conduct.
Georgia has apparently become a haven for fly-by-night operations promising high profits for investors in such ventures as worm-farming and
vending machine maintenance. Any person promoting such investment
schemes must now register and disclose various information prior to operating in Georgia. Failure to comply is a felony.
During the 1980 session the general assembly also made changes in a
variety of existing criminal offenses and procedures. The burglary statute
was amended" to re-enact a provision that was dropped when other parts
of the law were amended in 1978. The amendment redefines railroad cars
and aircraft as "buildings" that may be objects of burglaries.
Senate Bill 386'7 shows what can happen when a group of bankers tries
to rework a fairly clear and simple criminal statute. This bill pushed by
the banking industry repealed all the laws on credit cards and replaced
them with a financial transaction card law. The intent was apparently to
insure that every conceivable method of defrauding a bank would be
made illegal. The definition of a financial transaction card includes bank
cards, credit cards, check-cashing cards or "an instrument or device issued with or without fee by an issurer for the use of the card holder." The
law is a maze of self-contradicting provisions and penalties which include
a section making it a felony for one to exceed his credit card limits, section 1705.7, and a section eliminating the need to prove venue, section
1705.3. It is reasonable to expect some amendments to this law in 1981.
Another bill passed at the 1980 Session was House Bill 523,"' the Restitution Act, which attempts to enlarge the authority to use restitution in
court, probation, and parole situations. The laudable goals of this bill are
more than offset by the requirements of written findings concerning
whether or not restitution will be ordered, as well as a cumbersome list of
factors which must be considered, apparently as part of the record. The
net effect is to add much red tape to what was previously a simple
procedure.
The Discovery Bill " was one of the significant, though limited, changes
in criminal procedure. This bill is also very awkwardly written, partly
from having been amended on the House floor. The bill allows the defense to request copies of any written or oral statement made by the defendant. Discovery of laboratory reports is also permitted if such reports
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

1980 Ga. Laws 1233.
§ 26-1601(a) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1705 to 1705.9 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. ch. 27-30 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. ch. 27-13 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN.
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are to be offered in evidence.
Another significant procedural change comes from the Deposition Bill,
House Bill 1150.80 That bill allows either prosecution or defense to depose
a witness if the witness is in imminent danger of death or has been
threatened because of his status as a witness. However, the deposition
may be used in court only if the witness is dead.
Two bills affecting bad checks were also passed. One adds a rather
meaningless set of graduated mandatory minimum sentences for writing
bad checks. 81 The other bill, Senate Bill 523,2 attempts to cure the constitutional infirmities of the notice provision of Georgia Code Ann. section 26-1704.33 In Hall v. State,34 the court had disapproved the provision
that "notice . . . by . . . mail . . . shall be . . . equivalent to notice having been received . . . whether such notice shall be returned undelivered

or not." The new section makes it prima facie evidence that the accused
knew the instrument would not be honored if "notice . . . is returned

undelivered. . . when such notice was mailed within a reasonable time of
dishonor to the address printed on the instrument or given by the accused at the time of issuance." Although the wording is somewhat different from the former provision, the fate of this provision may be the same
as that of its predecessor.
The Unified Appeal Bill,8 ' a creature of the Georgia Supreme Court, is
meant to allow the court to develop new procedures in death penalty
cases. The court wants to insure that all issues are raised and disposed of
as soon as possible, rather than dragged out issue by issue in an endless
flow of writs and appeals. The new rules issued pursuant to this legislation may achieve this goal, but they may also create even more grounds
for extended legislation and further clutter pre-trial and trial procedures.
III.TRENDS

Over recent years, a number of trends have been noticeable in specific
areas of criminal law and procedure. While some of these trends, in the
area of pleading for example, show a tendency toward liberalization,
others, such as rulings on appellate procedure, seem to require increasingly strict compliance with court rules and statutory law.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1301(a) (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1704(b) (Supp. 1980).

GA.
GA.
244
GA.

CODE ANN. § 26-1704(a) (Supp. 1980).
CODE ANN. § 26-1704(b) (Supp. 1980).
Ga. 86, 259 S.E.2d 41 (1979).
CODE ANN. § 27-2538 (Supp. 1980).
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Variance Between "Allegata" and "Probata"

The trend in recent years has been away from strict compliance with
the "fatal variance rule." Where an indictment alleges the crime in such a
manner that the defendant is put on notice of the charge and could not
be re-tried for the same conduct, the indictment has been deemed
sufficient.
In Jones v. State,s6 the indictment alleged one date and the victim testified that the crime took place on two possible dates, June 1st or 2nd.
The court affirmed the conviction. In Rick v. State,s7 the drug alleged was
"pethidine" and drug proven was "pethidine hydrochloride". However,
this variance was not considered fatal. In Cobb v. State,s8 the indictment
alleged robbery "from the person" of the victim. Although the evidence
showed robbery "from the presence" of the victim, no fatal variance was
8 ' the indictment alleged that an individual was
shown. In Cline v. State,
the victim of armed robbery. Even though the property actually belonged
to a corporation, there was no fatal variance. In a similar vein, Gaston v.
State'0 held that there was no fatal variance when a burglary indictment
naming a corporation as the victimized owner was supported by testimony from an individual who was the actual owner. The reverse situation
arose in High v. State' 1 in which an individual owner was named in the
indictment whereas the proof showed a corporate owner.
A loose, commonsense sort of rule has developed in this area of the law
to replace the fatal variance rule. The fatal variance rule, when strictly
applied, had often led to overly technical reversals. The present trend
away from the rule is unlikely to be reversed.
B. Appellate Practice
In the arena of appellate practice, both appellate courts have been enforcing rules more strictly than in previous years. For example, the burden is on counsel to invoke a ruling of the trial court, without which there
can be no appellate review. " If no ruling is obtained, any error is deemed
waived.' If the record needs supplementing, the burden is on counsel to
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
State,
43.

150 Ga. App. 300, 257 S.E.2d 370 (1979).
152 Ga. App. 519, 263 S.E.2d 213 (1979).
244 Ga. 344, 260 S.E.2d 60 (1979).
153 Ga. App. 576, 266 S.E.2d 266 (1980).
153 Ga. App. 538, 265 S.E.2d 866 (1980).
153 Ga. App. 729, 266 S.E.2d 364 (1980).
For this point, see Tucker v. State, 244 Ga. 721, 261 S.E.2d 635 (1979); Dowdy v.
152 Ga. App. 145, 262 S.E.2d 511 (1979).
See Hill v. State, 150 Ga. App. 451, 258 S.E.2d 206 (1979).
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see that it is supplemented. 4 4
As for brief-writing, the trend of strict enforcement continues. The
court in Powers v. State5 held that enumerations cannot be enlarged
when one writes his brief, and if one does not argue or support enumerations, they are deemed abandoned . 6 As stated in Wilkie v. State:'7 "A
mere statement of what occurred at trial and the contentions of the appellant does not constitute an argument in support of such contentions."
C. Similar Transactions
There have been a multitude of cases allowing the introduction of separate crimes not alleged in an indictment when these similar transactions
show motive, scheme, intent, bent of mind or when they aid in identification.4s Similar transactions should be "so nearly identical in method as to
earmark them as the handiwork of the appellants.'4 9 The defendant must
also be identified as the perpetrator of the similar crime, of course.
While there appears to be a slight liberalization in the use of similar
transactions, there also appears to be a point at which the courts are very
closely scrutinizing these cases. If the other crime is only technically similar, then its relevance will be weighed against its prejudicial impact. In
Anglin v. State,50 for example, Judge Deen, who wrote the decision reversing a drug case, pointed out that a sale of marijuana earlier in the day
"cannot possibly tend to prove later possession." The rule as to the admissibility of similar transactions will undoubtedly continue to be the
source of much debate with each case being a new battleground.
D.

Search and Seizure

The law in regard to search and seizure is not undergoing the revolution of a few years ago but nonetheless continues to be refined by a flow
of decisions. One of the best summaries of the law concerning search war44. See Zachary v. State, 245 Ga. 2, 262 S.E.2d 779 (1980).
45. 150 Ga. App. 25, 256 S.E.2d 637 (1979).
46. See Rick v. State, 152 Ga. App. 519, 263 S.E.2d 213 (1979); Royle v. State, 151 Ga.
App. 88, 258 S.E.2d 921 (1979); Blanton v. State, 150 Ga. App. 559, 258 S.E.2d 174 (1979).
47. 153 Ga. App. 609 266 S.E.2d 289 (1980).
48. See, e.g., McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146 (1980); Laws v. State, 153
Ga. App. 166, 264 S.E.2d 700 (1980); Buffington v. State, 153 Ga. App. 54, 264 S.E.2d 543
(1980); Rhodes v. State, 153 Ga. App. 306, 266 S.E.2d 801 (1980); Sweeny v. State, 152 Ga.
App. 765, 264 S.E.2d 260 (1979); Johnson v. State, 152 Ga. App. 624, 263 S.E.2d 509 (1979);
Simmons v. State, 152 Ga. App. 643, 263 S.E.2d 522 (1979); Minis v. State, 150 Ga. App.
671, 258 S.E.2d 308 (1979); Silvers v. State, 151 Ga. App. 216, 259 S.E.2d 203 (1979).
49. See, e.g., Hart v. State, 149 Ga. App. 785, 256 S.E.2d 127 (1979); Williams v. State,
150 Ga. App. 852, 258 S.E.2d 659 (1979).
50. 151 Ga. App. 570, 260 S.E.2d 563 (1979).
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rant cases in which there is a confidential informant is Shaner v. State."
In Shaner, Judge Carley carefully and accurately explained the meaning
of a number of United States Supreme Court decisions, including Draper
v. United States," Aguilar v. Texas," and Spinelli v. United States."
The test required under those cases when an informant's tip is relied
upon is that the sworn information in the search warrant affidavit must
set forth the underlying basis for the informant's knowledge or provide
such detail that it is evident that the allegations are not simply based on
a casual rumor or accusation. Also, there must be a basis for proving the
informant's reliability. Shaner is unique in that no underlying basis is
given for the informant's knowledge and the informant had no history of
previous contacts with the police to establish reliability. In Shaner, however, the information given was unusually detailed as to description of the
defendants, their auto, their route of travel, and the time that they would
be travelling. The informant also described exactly what contraband
would be discovered and its location in the vehicle. This information satisfied the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli text. Although the informant
in Shaner had no "track record" of previous tips, the independent corroboration by the police of virtually all the information supplied by the
informant established the informant's reliability.
In another interesting search case, Berger v. State,5 the defendant attempted to retrieve his lost briefcase at a downtown Atlanta hotel. When
asked for identification, the defendant said his wallet was in the briefcase.
The security officer then opened the briefcase and observed marijuana as
he was removing the wallet. The seizure of the marijuana was upheld on
the ground that it is not an unauthorized search for hotel personnel to
open unlocked items in an attempt to determine ownership.
In Buday v. State," however, the fruits of a search of luggage were
found to be inadmissible. The defendant had been lawfully arrested in his
automobile and the luggage was in the trunk. The court relied at least
partially on Arkansas v. Sanders,5 7 which held that even though there
may be some right to look in the trunk of an auto there must be probable
cause to open the luggage found therein. One has an expectation of privacy with regard to his personal luggage.
A number of other expectation of privacy cases included Riden v.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

153
358
378
393
150
150
442

Ga. App. 694, 266 S.E.2d 338 (1980).
U.S. 307 (1959).
U.S. 108 (1964).
U.S. 410 (1969).
Ga. App. 166, 257 S.E.2d 8 (1979).
Ga. App. 686, 258 S.E.2d 318 (1979).
U.S. 753 (1979).
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45

State,5 8 in which a prison cell was held to be an area generating no expectation of privacy, and Dean v. State,0 in which a similar rule was applied
to a halfway house. In Reece v. State," an aerial search by helicopter in a
rural area revealed certain evidence not visible from the ground. No expectation of privacy existed. However, in Bunn v. State,", the partially
fenced area behind a rented apartment in an apartment complex was entitled to an expectation of privacy. It is unclear whether there would be a
clash between this case and Reece if the same items had been openly visible when observed from a helicopter.
In a case involving the scope of a search, Wyatt v. State," the court
held that a search warrant for a building does not allow an extensive
search of the occupants. The appellant was present while a search was
being carried out. After a pat-down for weapons, a more extensive search
of his person took place. The pat-down was permissible, but since the
search warrant did not name the appellant, a search of his person exceeded the limits of the warrant. In a case dealing with peculiarities of
search warrant affidavits, Reed v. State," the court held that the use of
double hearsay in a search warrant is permissible, particularly where the
hearsay is from one police officer to another.
In Cuevas v. State," an affidavit was attacked for containing knowingly
false information. The court held that if the claim affects information vital to establish probable cause, a hearing should be held to determine if
the warrant can stand without the false information. If the tainted information is disregarded, the warrant may still be good. The entire warrant
is not tainted by the mere existence of some false information.
E. Trial Court Charge to the Jury
Although the charge of the court continues to be the source of many
enumerations of error, there has been little major change in this area of
law since State v. Stonaker." There have, however, been a number of
unusual, though not earthshaking, decisions in this arena. A charge concerning good character was requested in McCollum v. State," because the
defendant testified he had "never been in trouble." The court found this
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

151
151
152
153
151
150
151
236
153

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

App. 654, 261 S.E.2d 409 (1979).
App. 874, 261 S.E.2d 759 (1979).
App. 760, 264 S.E.2d 258 (1979).
App. 270, 265 S.E.2d 88 (1980).
App. 207, 259 S.E.2d 199 (1979).
App. 312, 257 S.E.2d 280 (1979).
App. 605, 260 S.E.2d 737 (1979).
1, 222 S.E.2d 354 (1976).
App. 519, 265 S.E.2d 852 (1980).
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statement to be inadequate to require such a charge. In Powers v. State,67
the defendant requested a charge defining rape because the burglary indictment recited that the entry was with the intent to commit theft and
rape. The court of appeals agreed.
One of the traditional charges used by judges throughout the state was
attacked in Jenkins v. State." The charge requires the jury to reconcile
conflicts "so as to make all witnesses speak the truth and so as to not
impute perjury to any witness." The court approved this charge and
found that it does not unconstitutionally impair the jury's decision-making duties.
In three similar but unrelated cases, questions were raised with regard
to the requirement of charging on the offense set forth in the indictment.
In Johnson v. State," the basic rule was restated that if there is any
evidence on the offense charged in the indictment the court must charge
the jury on that offense. In Burnett v. State,7 0 the situation arose in
which the court charged not only on the language in the shoplifting indictment but also on language from the former shoplifting law. Since the
jury might have found the defendant guilty based on conduct that is now
legal, the decision was reversed. In Bennett v. State7 1 however, the defendant was indicted for robbery, and the judge charged the jury not only
on robbery but also on armed robbery. The court found that there was no
way the appellant could be harmed by this charge. Since he was only
charged with robbery, the jury could not find him guilty of armed robbery. Even if the jury thought he was guilty of armed robbery, robbery is
a lesser included offense. The added charge was mere surplusage.
F.

Guilty Plea

The entry and later withdrawal of a guilty plea has become a popular
subject producing some rather interesting case law. In Germany v.
State'7 the court of appeals adopted a new rule requiring the judge to
ask all the questions of the defendant when a guilty plea is entered. Traditionally, the prosecutor, sometimes aided by the defense lawyer, would
pose various questions to the defendant with the judge listening from the
bench. The reasoning of the court of appeals was based on Purvis v. Connell,73 which appeared to adopt Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. There is language in that rule discussing a "personal" inquiry
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

150
152
152
152
153
151
227

Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.
Ga.

App. 25, 256 S.E.2d 637 (1979).
App. 637, 263 S.E.2d 520 (1979).
App. 624, 263 S.E.2d 509 (1979).
App. 738, 264 S.E.2d 33 (1979).
App. 210, 264 S.E.2d 688 (1980).
App. 866, 261 S.E.2d 774, rev'd 245 Ga. 326, 265 S.E.2d 13 (1979).
764, 182 S.E.2d 892 (1971).
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of the defendant. This case proceeded to the Supreme Court of Georgia
by writ of certiorari in State v. Germany.7 4 The court of appeals was reversed. The supreme court held that literal compliance with Rule 11 is
not mandatory since the rule goes well beyond the constitutional requirements of Boykin v. Alabama.7" The net result of these two decisions is
that the law in Georgia in this regard is unchanged.
A number of other cases arose recently dealing with the collateral consequences of guilty pleas. Davis v. State,"6 held that "adverse unanticipated collateral consequences" of one's guilty plea are not valid grounds
for withdrawing a plea. In a refinement of this rule, Garcia v.State77
presented a situation in which a sentence on a guilty plea was to run
concurrently with "any federal sentence he may be now serving or required to serve." The federal parole authorities, however, decided to defer
revocation of Garcia's parole until he completed his state sentence. Garcia
was displeased and wanted to withdraw his plea. The court however
found his plea had been freely and voluntarily entered, and found the
subsequent action of federal authorities to be a collateral consequence beyond the control of the superior court.
In a similar case, Jeffares v. DeFrancis,7 8 the defendant and his counsel
were optimistic that a seven-year sentence could be served at a restitution
center. After the plea was entered, their optimism proved to be unfounded and they wanted to withdraw the guilty plea. The court said: "A
defendant's subjective hopes and unfulfilled desires, not induced by the
court or state, are not good grounds for attacking the resulting plea and
sentence." 7 9 It thus appears that a defendant and his counsel must anticipate the basic consequences of a guilty plea. Unless the state or the court
has misled the defendant, he will have to live with the bargain he has
struck.
G. Evidence
Decisions on the admissibility of evidence are almost as frequent in
criminal cases as are decisions on the charge of the court. Despite a large
number of evidence decisions, however, only slight modifications in the
rules of evidence have been made during the survey period. The traditional rule in homicide cases is that specific acts of violence by the victim
cannot be used to show the victim's reputation for violence. Only general
74. 245 Ga. 326, 265 S.E.2d 13 (1980).
75. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
76. 151 Ga. App. 736, 261 S.E.2d 468 (1979).
77. 152 Ga. App. 889, 264 S.E.2d 323 (1980).
78. 244 Ga. 183, 259 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
79. Id. at 184, 259 S.E.2d at 445.
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reputation evidence on this subject is admissible. Music v. State0 and
Wilson v. State" restated this rule. However, in Milton v. State,82 an
exception was developed.
In Milton, the victim of the homicide had previously assaulted the defendant, and the defendant claimed that the victim was engaged in such
an assault at the time of the killing. The trial court excluded the evidence
of specific acts of violence by the victim. The supreme court held that the
defendant and his witnesses could testify to the previous assaults since
this evidence was vital to the defendant's claim of self-defense. This exception was based not on the value of the evidence to show general reputation but as evidence of the relationship between the parties, which
played a major role in explaining the defendant's fear of the victim.
Another continuing trend in evidence decisions has been the liberalization of admissiblity requirements. Evidence of questionable relevance is
often allowed in evidence for whatever probative value it may have. Strict
chain of evidence requirements have been at least partially abandoned in
favor of allowing the jury to have full access to all evidence.
In Williams v. State,83 when the chain of evidence was questioned, the
court ruled that it was not necessary to show that the evidence was
guarded every minute in order to have an acceptable chain. In Gunn v.
State4 and Rutledge v. State,88 weapons were admitted because they
were similar to the weapons actually used. In Ligon v. State," a coat
hanger was admitted into evidence because it was found next to a car the
appellant was trying to enter and may have been used by the appellant.
Finally, in McCranie v. State,8 7 there was conflicting testimony about a
shotgun, with some witnesses claiming the gun used was of a different
gauge. However, the weapon was admitted and the issue of its probative
value and weight were left to the jury.
In another significant case, evidence of a defendant's silence was admitted, contrary to the general rule barring such evidence. In Emmett v.
State," a witness testified that a young boy accused the defendant of a
murder. The accusation took place in the presence of friends and relatives
at a gathering in a private home. Another witness to the confrontation
said the defendant "didn't say nothing
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the child told him to explain how he killed the victim. This evidence was
found to be admissible and not in conflict with Doyle v. Ohio8" or Howard
v. State.9 The distinguishing feature was that those cases dealt with incustody silence while the Emmett case was a totally noncustodial situation. Also applicable was Georgia Code Ann. section 38-409," which
states that "Acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an
answer or denial or other conduct, may amount to an admission."
Another interesting rule of evidence was analyzed in Emmett, because
the physical evidence had been lost or destroyed. Emmett's counsel
claimed that the defendant could not be tried without the physical evidence since he had a right to examine the evidence under Patterson v.
State.9 The court rejected this argument and refused to extend Patterson to require the production of all evidence to support a valid conviction. The defendant had failed to show any possible harm and had obtained reports on tests conducted on all the available evidence.
In King v. State," the court restricted the use of a death certificate to
use only as evidence of cause of death. Though Georgia Code Ann. section
88-77159" makes such documents admissible, the admissibility relates
only to the question of cause of death and not to other matters that may
appear on the certificate.
In O'Quinn v. State,95 the law in regard to bloodhound identification
was fully explored. An exacting foundation must be laid for such evidence, according to the rules for such admission, which were first set out
in Aiken v. State."6 The dog's training and testing must be shown, and a
witness with personal knowledge of the dog and its reliability must testify. Since this foundation was absent in O'Quinn, the observations by
witnesses that the dog sniffed the defendant should not have been admitted. Because the testimony was the only evidence identifying the defendant, the case was reversed.

89. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

237 Ga. 471, 228 S.E.2d 860 (1976).
GA. CODE ANN. § 38-409 (1974).
238 Ga. 204, 232 S.E.2d 233 (1977).
151 Ga. App. 762, 261 S.E.2d 485 (1979).
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-1715 (1979).
153 Ga. App. 467, 265 S.E.2d 824 (1980).
16 Ga. App. 848, 86 S.E. 1076 (1915).

